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COMMENTS ON PROPOSED REVISIONS TO
SUBPART J OF THE 1994 NATIONAL
CONTINGENCY PLAN
Meghan Gavin
ABSTRACT: The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan (NCP) provides the organizational structure and procedures
for preparing for and responding to discharges of oil and releases of hazardous
substances. Subpart J of the NCP governs the use of chemical agents to control
oil discharges, setting forth the criteria for listing an agent on the Product
Schedule—a list of the dispersants and other spill-mitigating substances that
responders may use in carrying out the NCP. Dispersants are chemical agents
that emulsify and disperse oil into the water column. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) last amended Subpart J in September 1994.
In light of research and lessons learned during and after the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon underwater oil well blowout, the EPA proposed amendments to Subpart
J in January 2015. Responders used a combined methodology consisting of
containment and recovery techniques, in-situ burning, and chemical dispersant
application to lessen the environmental impact of the Deepwater Horizon event.
Responders applied nearly two million total gallons of dispersants at the surface
and subsea, a controversial and unprecedented decision. When choosing this
methodology, responders weighed the potential benefits of intervention against
possible collateral harms. But with an outdated contingency plan and Product
Schedule, responders lacked data that could have helped to inform their risk
analysis. The EPA’s proposed amendments address this concern.
This Paper comments on the satisfactoriness of the EPA’s 2015 proposed
amendments for the following sections of Subpart J: section 300.915, which
details data and information requirements for listing on the Product Schedule,
focusing on the proposed efficacy and toxicity testing methodologies; proposed
section 300.950, newly limiting the submission of claims of confidential business
information; proposed section 300.970, providing grounds for the removal of a
dispersant from the Product Schedule; and section 300.910, which governs the
authorization of an agent for use during a spill response. Furthermore, this
Comment recommends that, in order to uphold the NCP’s command to apply a
response methodology most consistent with protecting the environment and
public health, the EPA should formalize a two-phase response plan into Subpart
J, thereby only permitting the use of dispersants after an informed weighing of
the tradeoffs indicates that containment and recovery techniques alone cannot
satisfy this mandate.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

“The truth is, nobody really knows what to expect, so you
have to be prepared . . ..People make too many decisions based
on incomplete information. You need to do your homework.”1
1. Martine Costello, A Recession-proof Business, CNNMONEY (Nov. 3, 1998, 9:31
PM), http://money.cnn.com/1998/11/03/smbusiness/q_smallbiz_downturn (quoting Paul
Hense).
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Mr. Hense, a member of the White House Council on Small
Business, spoke these words in 1998 to urge small business
owners to prepare for the economic downturn, but they ring
just as true for those preparing for a Spill of National
Significance, 2 such as the Deepwater Horizon event. 3 The
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan, otherwise known as the National Contingency Plan
(NCP), coordinates oil spill preparation and response. 4 In order
to best serve those choosing amongst response technologies,
the NCP must provide responders, particularly the Regional
Response Teams (RRTs), Area Committees (ACs), and OnScene Coordinator (OSC) with complete and relevant
information.
As required by sections 311(d) and 311(j) of the Clean Water
Act (CWA), amended by section 4201 of the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 (OPA), the President must prepare and publish a
national response plan in case of an oil spill or hazardous
substance release. 5 This plan must include a list—the Product
Schedule—of the chemical dispersants or other spill-mitigating
substances, if any, that responders may use in carrying out the
plan. 6 Dispersants are “chemical agents that emulsify,
disperse, or solubilize oil into the water column or promote the
surface spreading of oil slicks to facilitate dispersal of the oil
into the water column.” 7 Through Executive Order 12777, the
President delegated this authority to prepare and publish a
national contingency plan to the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA or Agency). 8
2. See generally U.S.C.G., COMMANDANT INSTRUCTION 16465.6 (2012),
https://www.uscg.mil/directives/ci/16000-16999/CI_16465_6.pdf (providing guidance to
the U.S. Coast Guard for designating an oil spill as a Spill of National Significance
under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan).
3. See U.S. EPA OIG, NO. 11-P-0534, REVISIONS NEEDED TO NATIONAL CONTINGENCY
PLAN BASED ON DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL, 1, ii (2011), http://www.epa.
gov/oig/reports/2011/20110825-11-P-0534.pdf [hereinafter Revisions Needed].
4. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 311(d)(2)(G), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2)
(2014); see also National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan,
40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1 et seq. (1994), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2000).
5. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2).
6. See id. § 1321(d)(2)(G); see, e.g., U.S. EPA, NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN
PRODUCT SCHEDULE (2014), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-08/
documents/schedule.pdf (providing the most recent Product Schedule as an example).
7. 40 C.F.R. § 300.5.
8. See Exec. Order No. 12777, 56 Fed. Reg. 54757 (Oct. 22, 1991).
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The EPA last amended Subpart J of the NCP in 1994 to
govern the use of oil spill and hazardous substance release
response technologies. 9 In addition to setting forth the
circumstances for the use of dispersants and other chemical
agents, Subpart J outlines twelve criteria manufacturers must
satisfy for their chemical agents to be listed on the Product
Schedule. The Regional Response Team (RRT), Area
Committee (AC), and On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) permit a
Responsible Party (RP) to choose from these listed agents
when responding to an oil spill or hazardous substance
release. 10
On January 22, 2015, 11 the EPA proposed changes to
Subpart J of the NCP, addressing concerns raised during the
2010 Deepwater Horizon underwater oil well blowout—one of
the worst environmental disasters in the history of the United
States. 12 After the Macondo well exploded 5,000 feet below the
surface in the Gulf of Mexico, responders used a combined
methodology consisting of containment and recovery
techniques, in-situ burning, and chemical dispersant
application to lessen the spill’s environmental impact. 13
Each of these three response tools presents advantages and
disadvantages. Containment and recovery techniques slow the
spread of spilled oil and remove it from the water. It rarely
results in the recovery of more than ten percent of spilled oil
however. 14 In-situ burning causes the oil to combust at the
surface, but it exposes on-scene responders to respiratory
health risks. 15 Dispersant application, whether at the surface
or subsea, does not reduce the total volume of oil in the
environment. Rather, it changes the oil’s chemical and physical
9. See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.900-.920.
10. See id. §§ 300.910-.920.
11. The comment period closed on April 22, 2015. No final rule was issued before
this article’s publishing. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 3379 (proposed Jan. 22, 2015) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 300.900-.920) [hereinafter Proposed Rule].
12. See id.; see also Deepwater Horizon Study Group, The Macondo Blowout
Environmental Report, Center for Catastrophic Risk Management 1, 7 (2011),
http://ccrm.berkeley.edu/pdfs_papers/DHSGWorkingPapersFeb16-2011/Macondo
BlowoutEnvironmentalReport-TA_DHSG-Jan2011.pdf.
13. See Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 2.
14. See id.; see also Charles W. Schmidt, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea:
Dispersants in the Gulf of Mexico, 118 ENVTL HEALTH PERSP. 338, 340 (2010).
15. See Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 4.
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properties, emulsifying it into droplets roughly ten microns in
size. 16 These droplets become entrained in the water column
where they eventually undergo various natural removal
processes; most commonly, marine bacteria metabolize the
oil. 17 In the meantime, dispersants expose a greater expanse of
the marine environment—the water column—to oil, and when
trapped underwater, oil’s lighter, more volatile components,
including benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene, cannot
evaporate. 18 Once settled in the anoxic and nutrient-limited
seafloor sediments, dispersed oil can persist for years, causing
chronic biological exposures that can reduce organisms’
productive and reproductive output, which can, in turn,
prevent an exposed population from recovering fully for
decades. 19 This Comment focuses on dispersant application,
the most controversial oil spill response and the technique
with the least understood consequences. 20
When choosing which response actions to accept and which
to reject, the RRT, along with the AC or OSC, must weigh the
potential benefits of intervention against possible collateral
harms. 21 Under this “risk-based paradigm,” a term coined by
the Deepwater Horizon Study Group, the benefits of using
chemical dispersants include shoreline protection, surface oil
volume reduction, and accelerated microbial decomposition
through oil emulsification and the resultant increase in surface
area. 22 On the other hand, the likely harms include facilitation
16. See id. at 3; see also Schmidt, supra note 14, at 340.
17. See Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 2; see also Schmidt, supra
note 14, at 340.
18. See Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 2.
19. See Charles H. Peterson et al., A Tale of Two Spills: Novel Science and Policy
Implications of an Emerging New Oil Spill Model, 62 BIOSCIENCE 461, 461 (2012)
(discussing, within the context of the Deepwater Horizon event, the need to modify
laws and policies designed to protect ocean resources in order to accommodate deep oil
drilling).
20. See generally John M. Cunningham et al., Use of Dispersants in US: Perception
or Reality?, 1991 INT’L OIL SPILL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 389, 392 (1991),
http://ioscproceedings.org/doi/pdf/10.7901/2169-3358-1991-1-389 (examining recent
U.S. oil spills in which responders evaluated whether or not to use dispersants, which
are controversial).
21. See Peterson, supra note 19, at 463.
22. See id. at 464; see also Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 3;
Schmidt, supra note 14, at 340. Members of the Center for Catastrophic Risk
Management at the University of California, Berkeley, formed the Deepwater Horizon
Study Group.
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of oil transport from the surface to the seafloor, increased
exposure of oil to subsurface marine life, infiltration into the
food chain and biomagnification (as zooplankton can mistake
dispersed oil droplets in the water column for food),
widespread mortality of pelagic and benthic organisms,
creation of larger dispersed oil plumes of uncertain fate and
environmental impact, addition of more toxins to the sea, and
elimination of any possibility for recovery of the dispersed oil. 23
Deepwater Horizon responders faced a spill of
unprecedented magnitude and depth for which they lacked
relevant data to create a well-informed response plan. 24
Responders needed accurate information about the ecological
and health impacts of prolonged dispersant use. 25 The EPA,
though, had not amended the NCP in the sixteen years prior,
failing to require improved dispersant efficacy and toxicity
testing protocols. 26 Much of the data that could have helped
the RRT, AC, and OSC to evaluate the ecological harms caused
by their chosen methodology still remain unknown. For
example, the rate at which chemically dispersed oil binds to
sediments, how quickly it breaks down, how undersea
organisms ingest it and take it up, what by-products result
when microbes degrade it, and whether the combination of a
dispersant and oil may be more toxic to marine life than oil
alone all remain unknown. 27 Responders also lacked, and still
lack, information about potentially adverse health effects
caused by dispersant use, 28 because it is difficult to separate
the symptoms of oil exposure from those associated with
23. See Peterson, supra note 19, at 464; see also Deepwater Horizon Study Group,
supra note 12, at 3; Schmidt, supra note 14, at 340.
24. See Peterson, supra note 19, at 462; see also Schmidt, supra note 14, at 340.
25. See Schmidt, supra note 14, at 340.
26. See generally National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan, 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.901. (1994).
27. See generally Roberto Rico-Martinez et al., Synergistic toxicity of Macondo crude
oil and dispersant Corexit 9500A® to the Brachionis plicatilis species complex
(Rotifera), 173 ENVTL. POLLUTION 5 (2013) (finding that when oil mixes with Corexit
9500A®, toxicity to B. manjavacas increases up to 52-fold, thus suggesting the toxicity
from Corexit application was underestimated in the case of the Deepwater Horizon
event); see also Schmidt, supra note 14, at 341.
28. See generally Gina M. Solomon, MD, MPH & Sarah Janssen, MD, PhD, MPH,
Health Effects of the Gulf Oil Spill, 304 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1118 (2010) (using the
Deepwater Horizon event to discuss the direct threats to human health from
inhalation or dermal contact with oil and dispersant chemicals and the indirect threats
to seafood safety and mental health).
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dispersant exposure. 29 Responders did know, however, that
dispersant exposure might enable oil to more easily penetrate
the skin. 30
Despite these unknowns, when evaluating the known tradeoffs, the OSC—the United States Coast Guard in this instance
(the Federal On Scene Coordinator or FOSC)—decided to
include dispersant application in the early stages of the
response plan. 31 Responders applied approximately one million
gallons of dispersants to surface slicks and approximately
three quarters of a million gallons, for the first time, subsea. 32
This use of dispersants raised many questions about the
sufficiency of the information Subpart J requires the RRT, AC,
and OSC to receive. 33
To address this concern, the proposed revisions to Subpart J
include new dispersant testing and listing requirements.
Specifically, the EPA proposes to “[r]evise the efficacy testing
methodology using a baffled flask test [(BFT)], establish new
developmental and sub-chronic toxicity testing requirements,
revise the acute toxicity testing methodologies, revise the
listing criteria, and establish use limitations to saltwater
environments.” 34 This Paper comments on the reasonableness
of the EPA’s proposed amendments and, moreover, suggests
that, in light of the NCP’s mandate in Subpart D to apply a
response methodology “most consistent with protecting public
health and welfare and the environment,” 35 responders should
authorize the use of dispersants only as a last resort, at least
until the effects of dispersants are better understood.
II.

BACKGROUND OF THE NCP PRODUCT SCHEDULE

The NCP establishes national response capabilities and
promotes coordination among a hierarchy of responders and
contingency plans for oil spills and hazardous substance
29. See Schmidt, supra note 14, at 342.
30. See id. at 324-25.
31. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 4, 8.
32. Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3381.
33. See generally Revisions Needed, supra note 3 (commenting on the need for new
testing procedures and response protocols in light of the Deepwater Horizon event).
34. Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3381.
35. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. §
300.310(b) (1994), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2000)).
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releases. 36 Either the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
or the EPA has modified the NCP in keeping with
environmental disasters and legislative advancements.
In 1968, the oil tanker Torrey Canyon spilled more than
thirty-seven million gallons of crude oil off the coast of
England. 37 To prevent similar environmental damage from
affecting the waters of the United States and to avoid
repeating the operational mistakes that had occurred in
England, the CEQ published the National Oil and Hazardous
Materials Pollution Contingency Plan shortly thereafter. 38
This 1970 plan established a comprehensive system of spill
containment and cleanup practices, favoring mechanical and
other physical control measures over chemical technologies. 39
It permitted the use of dispersants only when other methods
were deemed inadequate or infeasible and requirements for
listing on the Product Schedule had been met. 40 The Product
Schedule, Annex X–Schedule of Dispersants and other
Chemicals to Treat Oil Spills, restricted dispersants from use
in certain waters, such as those where the winds or currents
would likely bring the dispersed oil mixtures to shorelines
within twenty-four hours or those with major populations of
fish or marine species. 41
The CEQ renamed the plan the National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan in 1971 and made
other minor changes in 1972. 42
The CEQ revised the NCP in 1973 as a result of the newly
crafted Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, more

36. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 311(d)(2)(G), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2)
(2014); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.901.
37. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP)
Overview, U.S. EPA (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www2.epa.gov/emergency-response/national
-oil-and-hazardous-substances-pollution-contingency-plan-ncp-overview
[hereinafter
Overview].
38. Id.; See National Oil and Hazardous Materials Pollution Contingency Plan, 35
Fed. Reg. 8508 (finalized June 2, 1970).
39. See 35 Fed. Reg. 8508.
40. See id.
41. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3382.
42. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 36 Fed.
Reg. 16215 (1971); see also National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan, 36 Fed. Reg. 18411 (1972); National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan, 37 Fed. Reg. 28208 (1972).
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commonly known as the Clean Water Act (CWA). 43 Through
Annex X, the CEQ, while still advocating the use of mechanical
and other control measures, increased its tolerance of the use
of dispersants. 44
In 1975, the CEQ continued to advocate “the development
and utilization of mechanical control methods to remove or
mitigate oil,” while providing procedures for authorization of
the use of dispersants or other chemical agents in Annex X. 45
For listing on the Product Schedule, a dispersant
manufacturer needed to submit the dispersant’s shelf life,
toxicity, and effectiveness. 46
In response to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980, the EPA
amended the NCP in 1982. 47 Annex X became Subpart H of the
revised NCP. 48 Subpart H granted OSCs the ability to
authorize the use of listed dispersants to treat oil spills. 49 The
EPA Administrator then gained the authority to permit the
use of non-listed dispersants. 50
The EPA amended Subpart H in 1984. 51 One change
increased the OSC’s authority, permitting the OSC to
authorize the use of any product, including chemical agents
not on the Schedule, when the OSC concluded that a product’s
use was necessary to prevent or substantially reduce hazard to
human life. 52 The EPA also updated the testing and data
requirements for listing on the Product Schedule and created a
disclaimer, announcing that the listing of a product on the
Schedule served as a confirmation that the listing criteria had

43. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d). (1972); see
also National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 38 Fed. Reg.
21887 (1973).
44. See 38 Fed. Reg. 21887; see Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3382.
45. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. §
1510 (1975) (regarding 40 Fed. Reg. 6282 (1975)).
46. See id.
47. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40
C.F.R. § 300 (1982) (regarding 47 Fed. Reg. 31180); see also Overview, supra note 37.
48. See 40 C.F.R. § 300; see also Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3383.
49. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.
50. Id.
51. See id. (regarding 49 Fed. Reg. 29192 (1984)).
52. See id.
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been met, not as a recommendation for the use of that
product. 53
Responding
to
the
Superfund
Amendments
and
Reauthorization Act (SARA), the EPA made minor changes to
the NCP in 1990, reformulating Subpart H as Subpart J–Use
of Dispersants and Other Chemicals. 54
Most recently, prompted by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(OPA), the EPA revised the NCP in 1994. 55 “The final rule
significantly revised Subpart J to current regulatory
requirements with respect to authorization of use, data
requirements, dispersant effectiveness and toxicity testing
protocols, [etc.].” 56 For the last twenty-one years, the EPA has
not proposed any amendments to the NCP, until recently,
when it partially responded to “the political and social
nullification of the NCP [that took place] during the Deepwater
Horizon response” by suggesting modifications to Subpart J. 57
III. THE CURRENT RULE: SUBPART J OF THE 1994 NCP
By design, listing on the Product Schedule and the judgment
of the RRT, AC, OSC, and RP determine which dispersants, if
any, will be used to combat an oil spill. 58
A.

The EPA Sets Forth Twelve Criteria in Subpart J that a
Submitter Must Complete in Order for the EPA to List a
Dispersant on the Product Schedule

Subpart J details twelve requirements for listing on the
Product Schedule: providing the dispersant name, brand, or
trademark, if any; manufacturer, importer, or vendor contact
information; distributor contact information; shelf life;
handling and worker precautions for storage and field
53. See id.
54. See C.F.R. § 300 (1990) (regarding 55 FR 8666 (1990)); see also National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.900-.920 (1994),
amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2000)).
55. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.900-.920.
56. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3383.
57. See U.S.C.G., NATIONAL INCIDENT COMMANDER’S REPORT: MC252 DEEPWATER
HORIZON, 1, 4 (2010), http://www.nrt.org/production/NRT/NRTWeb.nsf/AllAttachments
ByTitle/SA-1065NICReport (emphasis in original) [hereinafter INCIDENT REPORT]; see
also 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.900-.920; see also Proposed Rule, supra note 11.
58. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.910-915.
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application;
recommended
application
procedures,
concentrations, and conditions; concentrations and upper
limits of heavy metals, cyanide, and chlorinated hydrocarbons;
contact information and qualifications of the testing
laboratory; documentation of adherence to the 1991 or 1992
Annual Books of American Society for Testing and Materials
standards; effectiveness results; toxicity results; and the
chemical agent components. 59 The EPA will list any product
whose submission packet meets these criteria, only reviewing a
submission for completeness and not independently confirming
test results. 60
The last three criteria—providing a dispersant’s efficacy,
toxicity,
and
chemical
components—are
especially
controversial and also important for the RRT and AC or OSC
to know during the risk evaluation. Therefore, this Comment
discusses these three criteria further here.
1. 1994 Effectiveness Testing
Under the 1994 NCP, effectiveness testing requires a
dispersant manufacturer to perform a Swirling Flask Test
(SFT). 61 For listing, a dispersant needs to attain an average
effectiveness value of only forty-five percent (dispersing fortyfive percent of the oil) when mixed with only two types of oil—
Prudhoe Bay Crude and South Louisiana Crude—and
saltwater at room temperature (twenty to twenty-three
degrees Celsius). 62
2.

1994 Toxicity Testing

Toxicity testing requires a dispersant manufacturer to
determine the product’s acute (short-term) toxicity by exposing
the product to only two saltwater species, the inland silverside
fish (Menidia beryllina) and the mysid shrimp (Americamysis
bahia). 63 Manufacturers expose these two species to five
concentrations of the product and also to one type of oil (No. 2
59.
60.
390.
61.
62.
63.

See id. § 300.915(a)(1)-(12).
See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 3; see also Cunningham, supra note 29, at
See 40 C.F.R. § 300.915(a)(7).
See id. § 300 app. C.
See id. § 300.915(a)(8) app. C.
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Fuel Oil), alone and in a 1:10 mixture of product to oil, for
ninety-six hours and forty-eight hours, respectively. 64 At the
end of this exposure period, a manufacturer calculates the
concentration of product causing fifty percent lethality (LC 50 )
to the two test organisms and reports this number to the
EPA. 65
3.

1994 Confidential Business Information

Subpart J asks a manufacturer to “[i]temize by chemical
name and percentage by weight each component of the total
formulation”; 66 however, manufacturers may assert claims of
confidential business information (CBI), refusing to make this
information public. 67 “Typically, manufacturers claim as CBI
the chemical identity (e.g., chemical name and chemical
abstracts number [CAS]) and concentration (weight percent) of
each chemical component in the product along with
information about the concentrations of those components in
the product . . ..” 68
B.

The OSC, RRT, and AC Determine Whether Responders
Will Apply Dispersants During an Oil Spill Response

Through Subpart J of the 1994 NCP, the EPA welcomes the
use of dispersants as an oil spill control measure. 69 Subpart J
encourages RRTs and ACs to develop preauthorization plans,
authorizing the use of certain listed dispersants in advance of
an oil spill. 70 For spill situations not addressed by a
preauthorization plan, Subpart J permits the OSC to authorize
the use of listed dispersants or other chemical agents on an oil
discharge. 71 The OSC may also authorize the use of any
dispersant or other chemical agent not listed on the Product
Schedule without obtaining concurrences from the EPA
representative to the RRT or from the affected states’
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See id. § 300 app. C.
See id.
See 40 C.F.R. § 300.915(a)(10).
See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3413.
See id.
See generally 40 C.F.R. § 300.910.
See id. § 300.910(a).
See id. § 300.910(b).
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representatives to the RRT if the OSC judges that the use of
the product is necessary to prevent or substantially reduce a
hazard to human life. 72
The OSC, in coordination with the RRT and AC, will
authorize the chosen response protocol, deciding between
mechanical collection, in-situ burning, dispersant or other
chemical agent application, or a combination of methods. 73
According to the EPA Office of Inspector General, “[t]he
decision to use dispersants involves tradeoffs between
decreasing risks to water surface and shoreline habitats, and
increasing potential risks to organisms in the water column
and on the sea floor.” 74 If the RRT and AC or OSC authorize(s)
the use of dispersants on an oil spill, practical considerations,
such as product availability, weather conditions, oil type, and
the discharge situation will influence which specific product
the RP applies. 75
IV. DISPERSANT APPLICATION DURING THE
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL
On April 20, 2010, ignited gases from API Well No. 60–817–
44169 (the Macondo well) caused the Deepwater Horizon
mobile offshore drilling unit, owned and managed by
Transocean and contracted by BP p.l.c., to explode and catch
fire forty-two miles off the coast of Louisiana. 76 An estimated
four million barrels of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico over
the next eighty-seven days, until BP sealed the Macondo well
on July 15, 2010. 77 Response technologies included
containment and recovery methods, such as the use of
absorbent booms, skimmers, and oil-water separators; in-situ
burning; and the application of chemical dispersants. 78
72. See id. § 300.910(d).
73. See id. § 300.910; see also Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3384.
74. Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 3.
75. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3395.
76. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 4; see also Deepwater Horizon Study
Group, supra note 12, at 2; Schmidt, supra note 14, at 339.
77. See In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20,
2010, No. MDL 2179, 2015 WL 225421, at *22 (E.D. La. Jan. 15, 2015) (finding four
million barrels of oil released from the reservoir in the Gulf of Mexico during the
Deepwater Horizon event); see also Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at
2.
78. See Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 7-8.
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The FOSC ordered responders to apply dispersants at the
surface two days after the explosion and directly at the
wellhead—an unprecedented decision—eight days after that. 79
“Approximately one million gallons of dispersants over a three
month period were deployed on surface slicks over thousands
of square miles of the Gulf, and approximately three quarters
of a million gallons of dispersants were, for the first time,
injected directly into the oil gushing from the well riser.” 80
Responders used Corexit EC9527A® and then Corexit
EC9500A® when stockpiles of the first diminished. 81 The
Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for Corexit EC9527A,
which was listed on the Product Schedule in 1978, indicates
that it contains the solvent 2-butoxyethanol, which may cause
skin or gastrointestinal irritation, hemolysis, or kidney or liver
damage. 82 Corexit EC9500A, which was listed on the Product
Schedule in 1994, contains petroleum distillates akin to
kerosene instead of 2-butoxyethanol. 83 Both products used
organic sulfonic acid salt for the surfactant and propylene
glycol as the stabilizer. 84 The Product Schedule indicated that
Corexit EC9527A had efficacy results averaging 50.4 percent,
and Corexit EC9500A’s averaged results equaled fifty
percent. 85 Corexit EC9527A®’s toxicity results showed that it
had a LC 50 of 14.57 parts per million (ppm) for Menidia
beryllina and 24.14 for Americamysis bahia. When mixed with
No. 2 Fuel Oil, the toxicity levels lowered to 4.49 ppm for
Menidia beryllina and 6.60 ppm for Americamysis bahia. 86
Corexit EC9500A presented with a LC 50 toxicity to Menidia
beryllina of 25.20 ppm and 32.23 ppm to Americamysis bahia.
When mixed with No. 2 Fuel Oil, the toxicity to Menidia
beryllina was 2.61 ppm and 3.40 ppm to Americamysis bahia. 87
79. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 4; see also Schmidt, supra note 14, at 340.
80. Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3381.
81. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 4, 8.
82. See Schmidt, supra note 14, at 342; see also BP, Regional Oil Spill Response Plan
019560 (2009), http://housedocs.house.gov/energycommerce./Docs_06152010/BP.Oil.
Spill.Response.Plan.pdf.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 8.
86. See Emergency Response: Corexit EC9527A, U.S. EPA (Dec. 31, 2014),
http://www2.epa.gov/emergency-response/corexitr-ec9527a.
87. See Emergency Response: Corexit EC9500A, U.S. EPA (Dec. 31, 2014),
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Practical considerations influenced the decision to use the
Corexit products specifically. The Region 6 preauthorization
plan was out of date at the time of the spill, as the RRT and
AC had not updated it to reflect deepwater drilling trends or
lessons learned during a 2002 Spill of National Significance
exercise. 88 The preauthorization plan also lacked stringency
and specificity, allowing the OSC to authorize the use of any
dispersant listed on the Product Schedule that the OSC
considered appropriate. 89 The EPA and the FOSC therefore
placed the decision in BP’s hands, requiring it, as the RP, to
identify an appropriate dispersant. 90 BP requested to use the
Corexit product, for which its Gulf of Mexico Regional Oil Spill
Plan expressed a preference. 91 After conducting additional
toxicity testing, 92 and in response to concerns, the EPA and the
FOSC shortly thereafter issued a second addendum to a Joint
Directive, requiring BP to select and apply a less toxic but
equally effective product within twenty-four hours. 93 BP
responded that Corexit was the only product available in
sufficient quantities within the imposed twenty-four hour
window, so a change in product did not take place. 94
V.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO NCP SUBPART J

In keeping with the Schedule’s history of modification after
an environmental disaster, the EPA proposed amendments to
Subpart J of the NCP in order to incorporate lessons learned
from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response. 95 The EPA
seeks to redefine dispersants as “typically mixtures of solvents,
http://www2.epa.gov/emergency-response/corexitr-ec9500a.
88. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 14.
89. See REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAM VI, FOSC DISPERSANT PRE-APPROVAL
GUIDELINES AND CHECKLIST 1 (2001), http://www.glo.texas.gov/ost/spill-responseresources/rrtvi/rrt6.pdf.
90. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 13.
91. See BP, supra note 82, at 019560.
92. See Kilduff, infra note 147, at 394. In August, after BP capped the Macondo
well, the EPA conducted a second round of toxicity testing. See U.S. EPA OIG, supra
note 3, at 5.
93. See U.S. EPA, DISPERSANT MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT DIRECTIVE add. 2
(May 20, 2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants/directiveaddendum2.pdf.
94. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 13.
95. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3381.
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surfactants, and additives that promote the formation of small
droplets of oil in the water column by reducing the oil-water
interfacial tension” and to make other changes affecting a
product’s eligibility for listing and authorization of use. 96
This Paper comments on the Agency’s proposals for the
following revised sections of Subpart J: section 300.915, which
details data and information requirements for listing on the
Product Schedule, focusing here on efficacy and toxicity
testing; proposed section 300.950, newly limiting the
submission of CBI claims; proposed section 300.970, which
newly provides grounds for the removal of a product from the
Schedule; and section 300.910, addressing the authorization of
an agent for use in response to a spill. 97
A.

The EPA’s Proposed Requirements for Listing Under
Section 300.915 May Still Not Provide the OSC, RRT, and
AC with Sufficient Information

In proposed section 300.915, the EPA seeks to increase the
criteria for listing outlined in Subpart J from twelve to twentyone. 98 While the EPA’s amendments modernize the efficacy
and toxicity testing protocols, the EPA could still strengthen
these listing criteria so as to provide responders with the best
information possible when weighing the environmental and
health tradeoffs associated with the application of dispersants.
1.

2015 Effectiveness Testing

In its January 2015 proposed amendments, the EPA
suggests changing the effectiveness testing method. 99 First, the
96. Id. at 3422.
97. See id. at 3422-3427.
98. See id. at 3424-25 (regarding section 300.915). One of these proposals—the
requirement that manufacturers provide the estimated annual dispersant production
volume, the average and maximum daily production volumes, and the timeframe
needed to meet that maximum volume—will help to ensure responders do not sacrifice
environmental and health concerns as a result of production limitations. See id. at
3425; see generally Response to Corrective Action Plan for OIG Report No. 11-P-0534,
Revisions Needed to National Contingency Plan Based on Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,
August 25, 2011, U.S. EPA OIG (2012), http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2013/11-P0534_IG_Comment_on_Response_(OSWER-2nd).pdf (acknowledging in memorandum
form U.S. EPA OSWER’s recommendations for amending the NCP in light of the
Deepwater Horizon event) [hereinafter Response to Corrective Action Plan].
99. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3403.
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EPA proposes switching from the SFT to the BFT. 100 Second,
the EPA proposes that manufacturers use Alaska North Slope
and Intermediate Fuel Oil as the test oils instead of Prudhoe
Bay Crude and South Louisiana Crude. 101 Third, the Agency
suggests that a manufacturer must test the product’s
effectiveness at two temperatures, five degrees Celsius and
twenty-five degrees Celsius, to reflect surface and subsea
temperatures. 102 Fourth, the EPA proposes increasing the
efficacy value required for listing such that a dispersant would
need to demonstrate that the lower ninety-five percent
confidence level (LCL 95 ) of six replicate flasks meets the
following criteria: at five degrees Celsius, a product must
disperse at least seventy percent of Alaska North Slope and at
least fifty-five percent of Intermediate Fuel Oil and at twentyfive degrees Celsius, a product must disperse at least seventyfive percent of Alaska North Slope and least sixty-five percent
of Intermediate Fuel Oil. 103 If a dispersant could not
demonstrate for each oil and temperature at the LCL 95
effectiveness values greater than or equal to these percentages,
the EPA would not list the product on the Schedule. 104
Addressing these proposals in turn, first, the change from
the SFT to the BFT is overdue. The EPA discovered over a
decade ago that the SFT was susceptible to human error and
identified the BFT—a more reproducible testing procedure—as
“the most appropriate efficacy testing protocol.” 105 The EPA
should also develop an action plan for more quickly
incorporating future scientific advancements into the NCP and
regional preauthorization plans. 106

100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 3425 (regarding section 300.915).
105. Competing priorities and changes in management, however, prevented the
EPA from revising Subpart J to reflect this scientific understanding before the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 8;.see also Albert D.
Venosa & Edith Holder, Laboratory–Scale Testing of Dispersant Effectiveness of 20
Oils Using the Baffled Flask Test, U.S. EPA 1, 1 (2011), http://www.bsee.gov/
Technology-and-Research/Oil-Spill-Response-Research/Reports/600-699/666AA/
(supporting the superiority of the BFT).
106. See Revisions Needed, supra note 3, at 11.
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Second, while Alaska North Slope and Intermediate Fuel Oil
represent a wider range of characteristics than the current test
oils, the RRT and AC or OSC should mandate that the RP
must test the efficacy of the particular dispersant it has
identified for use on a spill with regards to the specific oil
spilled before authorizing its use. Otherwise, the efficacy
testing results have only a general meaning from which
responders must extrapolate when assessing potential harms.
Third, by requiring testing at both surface and subsea
temperatures, the efficacy testing data provided to the RRT
and AC or OSC will be more informative. Prior to authorizing
the use of a particular dispersant, however, at the time of the
spill, the RRT and AC or OSC should require the RP to test
some dispersants’ efficacy under actual field conditions,
including using accurate saline, nutrient load, and
temperature measurements, in order to determine the most
effective product for that spill.
Further, the EPA should require a manufacturer to test a
product’s efficacy in shallow or shoreline waters, which are
often less saline. The initial Schedule disallowed the use of
dispersants along shorelines or in waters less than one
hundred feet deep, “except when used to prevent or
substantially reduce the hazard to human life or limb.” 107 But
here, where the EPA leaves open the potentiality for the
authorization of the use of dispersants in shallow or shoreline
waters, prior testing should at least reflect those conditions so
that the RRT, AC, and OSC may properly understand the
trade-offs at issue.
Fourth, the EPA should provide greater justification for why
it will accept an efficacy of only fifty-five percent for
Intermediate Fuel Oil at five degrees Celsius. This threshold
value, lower than the others the EPA proposes, represents an
increase of only ten percentage points from the threshold value
required by the 1994 Subpart J.

107. National Oil and Hazardous Materials Pollution Contingency Plan, 35 Fed.
Reg. 8508 (1970).
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2015 Toxicity Testing

The EPA also recommends revising the dispersant toxicity
testing procedure. 108 First, the EPA proposes amending
Subpart J to require submitters to use Alaska North Slope and
Intermediate Fuel Oil as the test oils for acute toxicity testing,
instead of the currently used No. 2 Fuel Oil. 109 The test species
will continue to be Menidia beryllina and Americamysis
bahia. 110 Second, the EPA proposes to conduct the oil-only
acute toxicity test for the two test oils, rather than requiring
the dispersant submitters to provide this data. Third, the EPA
suggests implementing a threshold for the lethal
concentration: the lower bound of the LC 50 ninety-five percent
confidence interval greater than or equal to ten ppm. 111 Under
this scheme, “LC 50 values ranging from 10 ppm to 100 ppm are
classified as slightly toxic[,] and above 100 ppm[,] substances
are considered acutely nontoxic to aquatic organisms.” 112
Fourth, the EPA proposes to require both a sea urchin
development assay to assess the adverse effects of a dispersant
product on the development processes of fish and invertebrates
and a sub-chronic assay performed on Menidia beryllina and
Americamysis bahia for seven days to estimate chronic
toxicity. 113 Both of these tests would also have assigned
threshold values. 114
Again taking these proposals in turn, first, the EPA
reasonably switches to Alaska North Slope and Intermediate
Fuel Oil because these oils exhibit a wider range of
characteristics than No. 2 Fuel Oil. 115 This change would also
make the toxicity testing procedure congruous with the
dispersant testing procedure. 116 As stated earlier, however, the
EPA should mandate that the RP test the toxicity of dispersant
it has identified for use on a spill with regards to the specific

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3404.
See id.
See id. at 3425 (regarding section 300.915).
See id. at 3404-05.
See id. at 3405.
See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3405.
See id.
See id. at 3404.
See id. at 3403-04.
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oil spilled and under realistic conditions before the RRT and
AC or OSC authorize that dispersant’s use. Otherwise, the
toxicity testing results have little meaning to the responder
weighing the potential harms of use versus non-use. 117
Similarly, instead of requiring a dispersant product’s
toxicity to be evaluated with regards to only two saltwater
species, the EPA should consider requiring testing against
more species. The Agency could mandate that before
authorization of a dispersant occurs, the RP must test that
dispersant on geographically and ecologically representative
species, including pelagic and benthic species affected by
subsea dispersant application, because LC 50 values for
dispersants and dispersed oil-water mixtures vary widely
among different species. 118 The EPA could also consider
requiring RPs to evaluate a product’s toxicity to metabolizing
bacteria and ecologically or economically important species of
concern. 119
Second, the EPA’s decision to conduct the oil-only acute
toxicity tests itself and to publish the results intends to reduce
manufacturers’ testing costs. 120 Unless one of these two oils is
spilled, however, this oil-only information will not provide
much use to the public or response teams. Also, having the
Agency conduct the oil-only tests may create a missed
opportunity for detecting anomalies in manufacturers’
submitted data. 121 Instead, before authorizing the shipment or
production of oil in waters of the United States, the NCP could
require the owner of the oil to test that oil’s toxicity on
organisms representative of the ecosystems through which the
oil will pass. This way, when a spill occurs, responders will

117. See generally Response to Corrective Action Plan, supra note 98 (responding to
the U.S. EPA OSWER’s recommendations to improve the NCP).
118. Schmidt, supra note 14, at 343. The EPA expresses concern with placing the
costs of developing and performing these tests on the dispersant manufacturer instead
of the end-user, but the manufacturer can compensate for these additional costs by
raising the sale price. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3406.
119. See Petition for Rulemaking Under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1321(d)(2)(G) and the Administrative Procedures Act Title 5. Sec. 553(e) to Amend
National Contingency Plan (NCP) Product Schedule (November 14, 2014),
http://www.rikiott.com/dispersants/peoples-petition-to-ban-dispersants/
[hereinafter Petition].
120. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3406.
121. See id. at 3405.
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have accurate and timely oil-only toxicity information for use
in the risk/benefit assessment.
Third, the EPA provides a rational explanation for its
suggested threshold values. 122 It recommends the lower bound
of the confidence interval (CI), recognizing the following:
[T]he CI should not contain any values less than or
equal to 10 ppm since theoretically, the LC 50 can fall
anywhere within the CI. By using the lower CI, the
Agency [provides] a conservative decision criterion
for acute toxicity, and by proposing a greater than
or equal to 10 ppm threshold level, it [establishes]
an adequate safety margin without being overly
restrictive. 123
Fourth, based on the critical need identified during the
Deepwater Horizon event to understand potential adverse
developmental and long-term effects of oil dispersants on fish
and invertebrate species, 124 the EPA reasonably adds
embryogenesis and sub-chronic assays to the listing criteria.
Rather than exposing test species to sustained concentrations,
in order to better mimic the effects of tidal cycles, the EPA
should consider requiring “spiked/declining” chronic exposure
tests. 125 Also, although the EPA suggests testing the
dispersant alone and the dispersant mixed with each of the
two test oils when determining acute toxicity, the EPA only
suggests testing the dispersant alone when determining
developmental toxicity and sub-chronic effects. The Agency
should explain why a manufacturer need not perform these
tests on the mixed solution of dispersant and saltwater,
especially when literature suggests the combination may be
more lethal than either alone. 126
Lastly, the CWA, as amended by the OPA, dictates that the
NCP must include a Product Schedule that identifies the
quantities of dispersant product that can be used safely in
waters of the United States. 127 Under section 300.910(a)(1),

122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See Schmidt, supra note 14, at 343.
126. See generally Rico-Martinez, supra note 27 (suggesting based on research that
Corexit combined with oil increases the toxicity).
127. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 311(d)(2)(G), 33 U.S.C. §
1321(d)(2)(G)(iii) (2014).
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preauthorization plans must limit the quantity of product that
responders can apply to spilled oil. 128 Because no such
requirement exists when a preauthorization plan is not in
place, in keeping with CWA, the EPA should add another
criterion to section 300.915, requiring manufacturers to
suggest a safe quantity of product that responders can apply to
a given area over a certain period of time. 129
B.

The EPA’s Newly Proposed Section 300.950 Limits CBI
Claims for the Public’s Benefit

Recognizing after the Deepwater Horizon event that the
public has a right to know about chemicals discharged into the
environment, the EPA proposes limitations to a
manufacturer’s ability to make a CBI claim in its submission
package. 130 Under section 300.950 of the Agency’s proposed
amendments, a manufacturer may only claim concentrations of
chemical components, microbiological cultures, enzymes, or
nutrients; otherwise, the EPA will not list the dispersant on
the Product Schedule. 131 The Agency will make all other
information public. 132
Because certain chemicals are more toxic to the environment
than others, the EPA could consider identifying certain
chemical components for which the public has a right to know
the concentrations, rather than allowing manufacturers to
avoid detailing the concentrations of every chemical used. This
trade-off would provide the public with greater information
while still enabling manufacturers to protect their trade
secrets.

128. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3422 (regarding section 300.910).
129. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2)(G)(iii); see also Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3424
(regarding section 300.915).
130. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3413.
131. See id. at 3413, 3426 (regarding section 300.950).
132. See id.
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Under Newly Proposed Section 300.970, the EPA
Strengthens the Relevance of the Product Schedule by
Providing for the Removal of Dispersants

The EPA proposes adding a section for removing products
from the Schedule, section 300.970. 133 This proposed section
identifies the following examples as causes for removal:
misleading or inaccurate statements regarding the composition
or use of the product to remove or control oil discharges,
alterations to the product without proper notification, failure
to publish the disclaimer that the EPA does not endorse the
product, or the discovery of information concerning potentially
adverse effects of the product to human health or the
environment. 134 The proposed section does not limit the EPA to
these causes, provided the Agency notifies the manufacturer of
its reasons for removing the product and allows for an
appeal. 135
The EPA should also consider adding a provision explicitly
permitting the public to petition for the removal of dispersants
despite any time restrictions. 136 For example, if a product fails
to perform in the field, or creates greater health risks to
humans or the environment than anticipated, removal from
the Product Schedule may eventually be proper. 137
D.

The EPA Clarifies the Requirements for Authorizing an
Agent for Use in Response to a Spill Under Section
300.910 But Could Make This Section Stricter

The EPA suggests amending section 300.910, which details
the requirements for the authorization of a product for use on
an oil spill. 138 Specifically, the EPA seeks to revise paragraphs

133. See id. at 3427 (regarding section 300.970).
134. See id. at 3416.
135. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3427 (regarding section 300.970).
136. See generally Alaska Cmty. Action on Toxics et al. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency et
al. and American Petroleum Inst., 943 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2013), appeal dismissed,
No. 13-5209, 2014 WL 2178666 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, 2014) (holding petitioners’
allegations that the EPA has failed to meet its requirements under the Clean Water
Act with regards to Subpart J of the NCP time-barred in light of jurisdictional
requirement 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)).
137. See Petition, supra note 119.
138. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3422 (regarding section 300.910).
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(a) through (f) and to add paragraphs (g), (h), and (i). 139 Many
of these proposed changes clarify the intent of the 1994
Subpart J, 140 but a few substantive changes warrant
discussion here.
For example, the EPA proposes to remove the qualifier
“when developing preauthorization plans” from section
300.910(f) (section 300.910(g) in the proposed January 2015
version), thereby clarifying that RRTs have the authority to
require supplementary efficacy and toxicity testing at any
time. 141 This provision, though clearer, is still discretionary.
The EPA should instead consider requiring RRTs and ACs to
order supplementary testing before the OSC authorizes a RP
to use a particular dispersant, unless relevant, incidentspecific data already exists.
The Agency also proposes to mandate that RRTs and/or ACs
must review, and revise as needed, preauthorization plans at
least every five years or after a major spill. 142 This review
requirement “intends to ensure that preauthorization plans
are actively maintained and updated to reflect revisions to the
Schedule.” 143 In light of the political delay that kept the
Agency from requiring the BFT prior to the Deepwater
Horizon event, the EPA should consider adding “major
technological or scientific advancements for oil recovery or
dispersion” as another prong triggering the review/revision
requirement.
Lastly, section 300.910(e) of the 1994 Subpart J prohibits
the use of sinking agents. 144 Proposed section 300.910(e), on
the other hand, crafts an exception, permitting the use of
sinking agents when the OSC judges it necessary. 145 This
change begs the question whether dispersants applied subsea
have the same effect as sinking agents, and if so, whether their
subsea use is proper without the requirement that responders

139. See id. at 3387.
140. See id. at 3387-89.
141. Id. at 3393.
142. See id. at 3423 (regarding section 300.910).
143. Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3389.
144. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40
C.F.R. § 300.910(e) (1994), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2000).
145. See Proposed Rule, supra note 11, at 3423 (regarding section 300.910).
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first exhaust all other options for recovery. 146 Because the
international petroleum industry has directed its marine
exploration and oil production activities to deep (i.e., greater
than 305 meters) and ultra-deep (i.e., greater than 500 meters)
fields in the Gulf of Mexico, 147 urgency exists to ensure that
the NCP properly accounts for these deep-drilling activities
that will likely require a subsea response. 148
VI. CONCLUSION
Subpart D of the NCP, which the January 2015 proposed
amendments would leave intact, explains the operational
procedures for removing oil. 149 It announces that response
actions may include, but are not limited to, source and spread
control or salvage operations, placement of physical barriers to
deter the spread of the oil, and the use of chemicals and other
materials in accordance with Subpart J. 150 It commands that
“[o]f the numerous chemical or physical methods that may be
used, the chosen methods shall be the most consistent with
protecting public health and welfare and the environment.” 151
The EPA should therefore consider adding a provision to
Subpart J that states a preference for containment and
recovery technologies over in-situ burning and chemical
dispersant application. 152 These physical technologies remove
oil, do not increase toxicity, and do not prolong the exposure of
crude oil to the marine environment, 153 whereas in-situ
burning exposes responders to grave health risks, 154 and

146. See Catherine Kilduff and Jaclyn Lopez, Dispersants: The Lesser of Two Evils
or a Cure Worse than the Disease?, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 375, 393 (2011); see also
Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 3 (citing Joye, S. B. et al., Soot and
Slime: Burning and Microbial Metabolism Altered and Transported Macondo Oil from
the Sea Surface to the Seafloor. (forthcoming)).
147. See Peterson, supra note 19, at 462.
148. See id.
149. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.310(a).
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. See Schmidt, supra note 14, at 340; see also Deepwater Horizon Study Group,
supra note 12, at 3.
153. See Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 3, 8.
154. See id. at 3-4.
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dispersed oil has the potential to threaten oceanic ecosystems
for years. 155
Accordingly, similar to the original (1970) NCP, the EPA
should consider setting forth a two-phased response protocol in
Subpart J. 156 The Deepwater Horizon Study Group suggests
that during the first stage of oil recovery, responders should
use containment booms to capture the spilled oil and skimmers
and absorbent booms to recover it. 157 If reached, the second
stage should begin only after an informed weighing of the
tradeoffs—based on data obtained from tests using the spilled
oil type and under representative conditions. This indicates
responders cannot protect the public health and welfare and
the environment without the use of alternative technologies,
such as when the spilled oil presents an imminent threat to
shoreline ecosystems. 158 Only once responders reach this
consensus should they add the technologies of in-situ burning
and chemical dispersant application. 159

155. See Schmidt, supra note 14, at 344.
156. See National Oil and Hazardous Materials Pollution Contingency Plan, 35 Fed.
Reg. 8508 (1970); see also Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 9.
157. See Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 9.
158. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40
C.F.R. § 300.910(a) (1994), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2000)); see also Deepwater
Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 9; see also Incident Report, supra note 57, at
17.
159. See Deepwater Horizon Study Group, supra note 12, at 9; see also Incident
Report, supra note 57, at 17.
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